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In order to describe a theoretic 
game we need to specify four essential 
elements: players, actions, payoff and 
information. Rasmussen refers to these 
by the PAPI acronym [2].
To develop a model based on 
game theory capable to describe an 
optimal defense resource allocation, 
and identify the planning “game” 
elements, a thorough conceptual 
understanding of ‘defense capability’ 
is required.
The Australian Defense Force 
defines  the  ‘defense  capability’  as 
“the power to achieve a desired 
operational effect in a nominated 
environment,  within  a  specified 
time, and to sustain that effect 
for a designated period”[3]. This 
comprises the combined effect of 
multiple inputs such as: personnel, 
organization, training, major systems, 
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1. iNTrODUCTiON
Warfare is a costly economic 
activity that combines inputs as 
varied as those employed in any 
ordinary economic activity.[1]
Game theory provides a number 
of analytical tools which are designed 
to assist in a more comprehensive 
understanding of phenomena 
occurring when decision-makers 
interact. A game describes the 
strategic interactions between players 
who act guided by their interests and 
with the consciousness that their 
actions affect each other. The basic 
entity in all game theory models is the 
player. A player may be understood 
as an individual, group of individuals 
or any kind of organization, even 
countries or alliances that need to 
make decisions.34
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supplies. The Department of Defense 
of Us defines as a military capability 
“the ability to achieve a desired 
effect under specified standards and 
conditions through combinations 
of means and ways to perform a set 
of tasks” [CJCSI/M 3010 series]. It 
includes four major components: 
force structure, modernization, 
readiness, and sustainability.
Both definitions are built around 
the notion of ‘effect’. This leads us 
to the question “what decisions can 
be taken to maximize the general 
security effect, having designed 
certain capabilities to encounter 
certain threats, under the pressure of 
limited available resources (such as 
the allocated defense budget)?”
The model developed in this 
paper is focused on allocations of 
the available defense resources over 
the assumed capabilities in order 
to achieve the best response to the 
national security. I consider as a game 
the competition between strategic 
decision-makers involved in defense 
resource management and the threats 
to the national security.
2. MiLiTArY EXPENDiTUrES 
iN NATO COUNTriES
A military force is “only 
as effective today as current 
capabilities allow. And, in future, 
it will only be as effective as 
investments in new capabilities 
made today will allow” [4].
In the opening of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly annual 
session, Dubrovnik, 11 October 2013, 
the president, Hugh Bayley stated 
that “Without strong capabilities, 
our ambition to defend our interests 
and the values we stand for will 
be unfulfilled, and our response to 
crises will be narrow, limited and 
possibly ineffective”.
Against a background of 
economic austerity, delivering NATO 
Forces 2020 will only be possible if 
the Allies spend smarter. This means 
spending more efficiently, including 
more multinational cooperation, 
and spending more effectively, that 
is making sure that their militaries 
retain their ability to operate together 
as they have done on NATO-led 
missions. [5]
2.1. An analysis 
of defense expenditure structure
Military expenditures are made 
in order to assure inputs for national 
defense. These comprise in acquiring 
manpower, fuel, food, buildings, 
weapons, and so on. The relationship 
between these inputs and defense 
capabilities is a very important and 
yet a very difficult area to study 
for a single country or to compare 
across countries.
NATO publishes an annual 
compendium of financial, personnel 
and economic data for all member 
countries. Since 1963, this report 
has formed a consistent basis of 
comparison of the defense effort of 
Alliance members based on a common 
definition of defense expenditure.[6]
Analyzing the 13 April 2012 
report related to defense financial and 
economical data among alliedthere 
are four main categories in which 
military expenditures are structured:
• Personnel expenditures;
• Equipment expenditures;
• Infrastructure expenditures;
•  Operations  and  Maintenance 
expenditures.Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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Category 
of expenditure
The average
per countries
(%)
Maximum  
average  
percentage
(%)
Minimum  
percentage
(%)
1990-2011 2011
Personnel* 57.14 59.84 75.4
Belgium
31.55
Estonia
Equipment** 15.38 13.54 27.47
Turkey
6.72
Belgium
Infrastructure*** 3.62 3.25 13.72
Estonia
1.04
Portugal
Other expenditures 
****
23.86 23.37 39.73
Estonia
11.47
Albania
 
* Personnel expenditure include military and civilian personnel expenditures and pensions;
**   Equipment expenditures include major equipment expenditures and R&D devoted 
to major expenditures;
*** Infrastructure expenditures include NATO common expenditures and national 
military constructions;
**** Other expenditures include operations and maintenance expenditures, other R&D 
expenditures and expenditures not allocated among above-mentioned categories.
Table no. 1 Distribution of total defense expenditure by category
The personnel expenditure 
between 1990-2011 has increased 
reaching in 2011 about 60% percent 
from total defense expenditures.
The investments in major 
equipments have fell by nearly 2%, in 
2011, from the average along the time.
The infrastructure expenditures 
were  maintained  at  around  3.62%, 
as average over the time. The 
largest percentage of total defense 
expenditure was allocated by Estonia 
for infrastructure, over 13% every year, 
starting 2004 when it joined NATO.
In conclusion we observe that the 
largest cost for defense, among NATO 
countries, is given by personnel 
expenditures and the relationship 
between equipment expenditures 
and the cost for operation and 
maintenance is about 1:1.6.
2.2. The defense effectiveness 
function
The main objective which is 
taken into consideration by strategic 
decision-makers when planning to 
develop a defense capability is to 
achieve the best response against 
possible and probable threats to 
national security. The evaluation 
of effectiveness of a particular 
capability is hard to do. We cannot 
evaluate its performance only based 
on how this acts individually. To 
have a complete evaluation we need 
to see a military capability in a more 
complex environment, integrated in 
the defense capability as a whole and 
in connection with other capabilities. 
To evaluate the military power of a 
country does not simply mean looking 
at its defense capabilities, and their 
performance. This has to be viewed 
in a global context, geographical, 
political, demographical, and to 
identify the available resources to 
support the defense system.
A broad analysis of military 36
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power is made by Global Firepower 
[7], which has come with a ranking 
system using over 40 factors to 
determine each nation’s Power 
Index (“PwrIndx”) score. Along the 
specific  military  capability  (land 
system, total aircrafts, and total 
naval strengths) they also count 
the  financial  factors,  the  resources 
indicators, the logistic infrastructure, 
even the geographical characteristics 
such as square land area, coastline, 
shared border, waterways. The lower 
Table no. 2 The relationship between the effectiveness parameter 
and defense expenditure in NATO countries
NATO countries
Defense expenditure 
2011
(billion dollars)*
Power Index* Effectiveness
Croatia   0.97          1.7413  1.41
Romania               2.38  1.6555 7.07
Portugal  3.61 1.7627 0.00
Denmark  4.52 1.616 9.68
Belgium   5.54 1.7266 2.38
Greece                6.43  1.6527 7.26
Poland   8.91 0.9518 53.52
Spain   13.98 1.1847 38.15
Canada   23.69 0.8638 59.33
Italy               30.22  0.6838 71.21
France   53.44 0.6163 75.66
Germany  48.14 0.6491 73.50
United Kingdom  63.57 0.5185 82.11
United States  731.88 0.2475 100.00
“Power Index” ranks show countries 
with higher military power.
In order to see how military 
spending  is  reflected  in  the 
effectiveness of a country’s 
military power we transformed the 
IndexPower into an effectiveness 
parameter, on a scale between 0 and 
100; a lower IndexPower shows a 
higher effectiveness parameter. The 
transformation formula is as follows:
* source: http://www.globalfirepower.com/ - Global FirePower;
** Source: http:/www.nato.int/  Current price and exchange rate.
The  correlation  coefficient 
between the effectiveness parameter 
and defense budget (Table 2) is 
0.46, which means that we have a 
moderate relationship between these 
variables, and also shows there are 
others variables which influence the 
effectiveness parameter of military 
power.
In this research it is not important 
the absolute values of parameters, we 
need only to see the path in which they 
influence each other. If we denote E 
the relative effectiveness parameter Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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Tucker, and others.
Game theory consists of a set of 
analytical tools designed to help us understand 
the phenomena that we observe when 
decision-makers interact.
3.1. Definitions and game elements
A game describes a strategic 
interaction between players who have 
to choose between a series of actions 
respecting a series of rules (constraints 
on the actions in order to maximize their 
interest). A solution is a methodical 
description of the outcomes that may 
come out in a family of games.
A strategic game is a model of a 
situation in which each player chooses his 
plan of action, and all players’ decisions 
are made simultaneously (that is, when 
choosing a plan of action each player is 
not informed of the plan of action chosen 
by any other player). By contrast, the model 
of an extensive game specifies the possible 
orders of events; each player can consider 
his plan of action not only at the beginning of 
the game but also whenever he has to make a 
decision. [8]
The basic entity in all game theoretic 
models is the player. A player may be 
interpreted as an individual or as a group 
of individuals making a decision. Once 
we  define  the  set  of  players,  we  may 
distinguish between two types of models: 
those in which the sets of possible actions 
of individual players are primitive and 
those in which the sets of possible joint 
actions of groups of players are primitive. 
sometimes models of the first type are 
referred to as “noncooperative”, while 
those of the second type are referred to 
as “cooperative” (though these terms 
do not express that well the differences 
between the models).
The central concept in non-
cooperative game with two or more players 
is  the  Nash  equilibrium.   This  defines  a 
solution concept in which the rational 
of military power, calculated with 
the formula (1), and Bd the budget 
allocated to the Ministry of Defense, 
we can assume for the function 
E=E(Bd) the following properties:
•  It is an increasing function: dE/
dBd>0
•  It is strictly a concave function 
on the interval  : 
for any   , and    ;
•  It is upward limited: there is 
an effectiveness limit above 
which the defense power cannot 
increase regardless the allocated 
budget.
Figure 1. The path of Effectiveness-
Defense Expenditure function
One type of function which can 
meet the above conditions is the 
logistic function which can take the 
following form:
where A and k are parameters which 
determine the path of function.
3. GAME THEOrY 
FUNDAMENTALS
Game theory is an area of 
mathematical study with direct 
applications in economics, sociology, 
and  psychology.  The  theory  was  first 
formulated by John Von Neumann, and 
later was developed by John Nash, A. W. 38
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players having chosen a strategy cannot 
gain anything by changing unilaterally 
their own strategy. 
The Nash equilibrium is used 
to analyze the outcome in strategic 
decision-makers interaction. 
3.2. Contest success function 
In game theory the contests are games 
in which each a player exerts effort in 
order to increase his or her probability 
of winning a prize. The contest is a 
very useful tool to study phenomena 
in economics, warfare and other social 
domains.
The main components of a contest 
are the players’ probabilities to win or 
lose given their level of effort. These 
probabilities described as functions 
of efforts are called contest success 
functions.[9] Regarding their use, an 
analogy with production functions 
from production theory can be made. 
But there are two important differences 
between production functions and 
contest success function. Related to 
outputs, the production functions 
provide deterministic results as to 
contest functions probabilities. Looking 
at the inputs, contest functions take 
into consideration the efforts of the 
participating players to determine the 
probability of winning. These efforts 
are combined adversarially, “so that 
a player’s probability of winning is 
increasing in her or his effort but is 
decreasing in the efforts of all the 
adversaries” [10].
Contest success functions, which 
show how probabilities of winning 
depend on resources devoted to a 
conflict, have been widely used in the 
literature addressing appropriative 
activities (economics), international and 
civil wars (political science), and group 
conflict  and  selection  (evolutionary 
biology). Two well-known forms of 
contest success functions predict contest 
outcomes from the difference between 
the resources of each side and from the 
ratio of resources.
Consider two adversaries or 
contestants, labeled 1 and 2. Denote their 
choice of efforts as x
1 and x2. We suppose 
that efforts are themselves outputs of 
production functions of different inputs. 
These production functions can be the 
same for the two adversaries or they can 
be different. Associated with them are 
cost functions c1(xi) and ci(x2). Since we 
are solely concerned with how pairs of 
efforts translate into probabilities of wins 
and losses and not how efforts might 
be chosen, we will keep these cost and 
production functions in the background. 
For any given combination of efforts, 
each rival has a probability of winning 
and a probability of losing. Denote the 
probability of party i=1 winning as p1 
(x1, x2)   and the probability of party i=2 
winning as p2 (x1, x2) .
The properties of those probabilities 
need to be as follows:
The general form of these 
probabilities that has been widely 
examined is as follows:
There are two main forms which are 
commonly used for the function f. One 
of them takes the exponential form as 
 , where    (and often, for 
technical reasons of existence of pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium, ). This 
form provides probabilities of winningJournal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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and could generate an interest for a 
potential aggressor. As an example, a 
target such as The U.S Statue of Liberty 
has substantial symbolic value, and no 
human value. I do not want to insist with 
more details what a target comprises and 
how this can be evaluated. For my purpose 
I take into consideration a theoretical 
target which has a different value from a 
defender’s and attacker’s perspective. 
The first and foremost approach to 
modeling a player’s interest is utility 
theory. This theoretical methodology 
deals with measuring the degree of 
preference across a set of available options. 
The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate 
the targets, but we need to set the theoretical 
values for each target, measured in money. 
Further research will explore in details the 
ways of evaluation.
“The functionality or successful 
operation of each target depends on the 
relative investments in defense versus 
attack. The defender seeks functionality 
of the system while the attacker seeks 
non-functionality. The approach allows 
analyzing the phenomenon from both the 
defender and attacker’s point of view.”[11]
The assumptions concerning the 
defender and attacker are that they both 
think at strategic level and are capable to 
adapt optimally their own actions to the 
opponent’s actions by spending defensive/
offensive resources for each target.
4.2. resources allocation over defense 
capabilities
The main purpose in defense 
resource allocation is to assure such 
level of readiness of existing capabilities 
in order to respond optimally to a set of 
threats against national security.
We assume that the defender has 
developed a series of capabilities, noted 
 to defend, independently, 
a specific ‘target’ with a specific value, 
against the attacker. For this step of 
research, we assume that the readiness 
level of a capability does not have any 
influence over the level of readiness of 
which depend on the ratio between the efforts 
of two parties, and looks as follows: 
Another well-know form of function 
f  uses  the  “logit”  specification    as 
, where  , and the 
probabilities for winning become as 
follows:
4. MODELS TO PLAN DEFENSE 
rESOUrCES
4.1. The main elements of the models
In the following game models 
we have defined, on the one hand, the 
main  player  under  the  fictitious  name 
‘defender’, who tries to defend as much 
as possible a series of valuable targets. 
On the other hand we have an ‘attacker’ 
who tries to attack the targets and 
determine as much losses as possible.
The notion of ‘attacker’ does not 
define  a  specific  country  or  terrorist 
organization that interacts with national 
security; it takes into consideration the 
effect of its action as a ‘threat’ against 
national security. This threat is evaluated 
in terms of probability of occurrence and 
the level of impact over the target on which 
is directed. I assume that the attackers (as 
well as their generated threats) are neither 
static, or fixed, nor immutable.
When I refer to a target I mean 
a complex system which can be 
conceived to have economic value, 
human value, and/or symbolic value, 40
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other capabilities.
Each target    has an 
evaluation from both the defender’s and 
attacker’s point of view. The defender 
evaluates the target Ti with the total value 
‘vi’ (economic, human and symbolic). 
From the attacker’s perspective, the 
same target has different evaluations.   
We denote Vi the value of the target Ti 
from the attacker’s perspective.
In order to defend the target Ti, the 
defender needs to spend the resources 
xi for the capability Ci to assure a certain 
level of readiness. The total cost of 
allocated resources is constrained by the 
defense budget Bd.
In the same way we consider that the 
attacker exerts a resource effort yi to attack 
each target Ti. The total costs of allocated 
resources are also constrained by the 
budget of the attacker Ba.
The defender’s aim is to save 
as much as possible from the total 
value of the defended targets, through 
resource allocations for each developed 
capability.
The total value expected to be saved 
by defender if a confrontation with the 
attacker occurs is:
where    is the 
probability to have success in defending 
the target Ti .
The objective function for the 
defender is to maximize the total value 
expected to be saved:
If the attacker chooses to launch 
an attack against the defender, the total 
value expected to be caused is:
where   is the 
probability of the attacker to have 
success on the target Ti.
The aim of the attacker is to cause as 
much damages (lost value) as possible to 
the defender (targets).
4.3. Multi-year expenditures.
The investment plan
When defense planners decide to 
invest in a new capability in order to 
improve the effectiveness of national 
defense, it is compulsory to be also 
aware of how much resource remains 
to operate the existing capabilities.
In this model the defender has 
not only to analyze the status of the 
current security environment every 
year but also to anticipate how this 
evolves. In this respect, the defender 
has to decide how much resource 
has to be allocated to assure the 
optimum level of readiness of current 
capabilities and how much is needed 
to be invested in order to have a better 
defense in the future.
Let us denote  x0(t) the 
expenditures allocated by defender 
to operate the existing capabilities, 
and xi(t)  the expenditure invested 
in developing the new capabilities, 
where  , a specific fiscal year.
Without missing the general 
aims of this paper we assume that 
the defense budget is spent only 
to develop new capabilities and to 
operate the existing ones.
The budget constraint can be Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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If we consider a target which is 
defended by the defender against 
the attacker and is evaluated with the 
v respectively V value by the defender, 
respectively attacker, then the value 
expected to be saved (to be de damaged) at 
the t moment is as follows:
The total value expected to be saved 
(damaged)  after  “n”  fiscal  years  can  be 
expressed as follows:
The objective for the defender and 
the attacker is to maximize the total value 
expected to be saved (damaged) over a 
period of the time n:
5. NUMEriCAL rESULTS
Let us imagine a virtual country, 
XLand (defender), in a security 
environment posing a series of threats 
from a virtual enemy, YLand (attacker). 
The Ministry of Defense has to develop 
a series of capabilities, with a limited 
written as follows:
We assume that the effectiveness 
of the defense capability as a whole is 
given by the total value of the inventory 
at each time I(t):
Taking into consideration the 
function form (2) of the effectiveness 
we can write:
where   is the effectiveness of 
defense capability, and A parameter.
In the same way we can analyze the 
attacker, at time t:
where:
•  yo(t) and yi(t) is the expenditure 
invested by the attacker to operate 
the existing capabilities and to 
invest in new ones;
•  Ia(t) t=0…n the total value of 
the capabilities inventory of the 
attacker;
•  φ(t) is the effectiveness level of the 
attacker’s capabilities;
Both the defender and the attacker 
use long term analysis, check the 
probabilities of success if confrontations 
occur, and evaluate what the level of 
total saved (total damages) value will 
be if a confrontation occurs.
The probabilities of success at the t 
moment take the following forms:42
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The second problem which is faced 
by the defender is how to choose the 
proportion between the operation 
expenditures and the investments in 
new capabilities in order to achieve a 
best response to the threats generated 
by the attacker.
The main data on which the 
defender develops his plan is described 
in Table 5.
Table no. 3 Defender’s and attacker’s target evaluations
through the following parameters: 
To estimate the probability of success 
both the attacker and defender use the 
different form of CFS.
Taking into account all of the above 
assumptions and evaluations, and with 
the help of Excel solver, it can be found 
out that the model rapidly converges 
to the Nash equilibrium, and there is 
a single optimal solution in resource 
allocations to defend/attack the targets 
for both defender and attacker (Table 
4). This solution assures the “maximum 
saved value” – 4662 billion dollars 
(from the defender’s perspective) and 
“the maximum lost value” – 2032 billion 
dollars (from the attacker’s perspective), 
if a conflict between the defender and the 
attacker occurs. Any other allocation of 
resources will conduct to less output for 
both the defender and the attacker.
budget, in order to counter these threats.
In the process of capability based 
planning it was assumed that three types 
of capabilities are necessary: A - land 
defense, B- air defense, and C – maritime 
defense. Each of these capabilities is 
developed to defend, against the virtual 
enemy, three virtual independent targets 
(having human value, economic value and 
also symbolic value): T1 - land territory, 
T2 – airspace, T3 – maritime territory.
It is assumed that both the defender 
and the attacker have different evaluations 
of the three targets as described in Table 
3. Their actions (defending and attacking) 
against three targets are limited by the 
budget allocation: Bd = $300 billion – the 
defender’s budget, Ba = $400 billion – the 
attacker’s budget.
The defense planning specialists 
evaluate the cost- effectiveness of both 
their own and attacker’s capabilities 
Capability Targets Defender’s target 
evaluation (billion dollars)
Attacker’s target 
evaluation (billion dollars)
A. Land 
Defense
T1. Land
Territory
3000 2800
B.Airspace 
Defense
T2. Airspace 2000 2500
C. Maritime 
Defense
T3.Maritime 
Territory
1500 1700
 
Table no.4 Defender’s and attacker’s resource allocations
Capability Targets Defender’s target 
evaluation (billion dollars)
Attacker’s target 
evaluation (billion dollars)
A. Land 
Defense
T1. Land
Territory
134 155
B.Airspace 
Defense
T2. Airspace 94 145
C. Maritime 
Defense
T3.Maritime 
Territory
72 100
TOTAL rESOUrCE 
ALLOCATiON
300 400Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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fast the equilibrium and provides a 
unique optimum solution for defense 
expenditure in every year. To solve the 
model Excel,and its feature solver, is 
used again. The results are given in the 
table below.
As we observe, the defender, in 
order to have an optimum response 
against the attacker’s threats chooses 
to invest a part from the budget to 
improve the effectiveness of the 
capabilities, and increase the value of 
the inventory. For a 6 year period of 
analysis, the defender has to invest only 
in the first three years, with the main 
effort in the first fiscal year. The ratio 
between the expenditure on operation 
and investments, in the first fiscal year, is 
1.60. The analysis has to be made by the 
defender in order to adapt his strategy to 
any changes in the attacker’s strategy.
Table no.5 Plan details
Details Defender Attacker
Defense Budget
(billion dollars)
300 400
The total value of 
existing inventory
(billion dollars)
3000 3000
The total estimated 
value of the targets
(billion dollars)
6500 7000
The period of time which is 
taken into consideration for analysis 
is 6 years. Every year the defender 
updates his capabilities inventory by 
investment expenditure in order to 
increase the effectiveness. The rest 
of the budget is spent to operate the 
existing capabilities.
This model for planning the 
defense expenditure reaches very 
Fiscal 
Year
Operation 
expenditure
Investment
expenditure
The value of 
current inventory
Effectiveness Probability 
of success
2014 185 115 3114 0.51 0.47
2015 222 78 3190 0.52 0.47
2016 275 25 3212 0.52 0.46
2017 300 0 3212 0.52 0.46
2018 300 0 3212 0.52 0.46
2019 300 0 3212 0.52 0.46
Table no.6 Defense expenditures by FY
  6.CONCLUSiONS
These models, developed based on 
game theory, can become a powerful 
tool for defense planning makers who 
need to design the structure of resource 
allocation over the capabilities.
The major problem faced was in 
defining the elements of the games in 
such ways in which the equilibrium 
can be reached, and provide a solution 
to defense capability planners. In this 
respect, Rasmunsen states that “lack 
of a unique equilibrium is a major 
problem in game theory” [2]. 
Even some parameters of the game 
are hard to be evaluated (the value of the 
targets, the cost effectiveness parameters. 
In this respect, the models can provide 
a structure of resource allocation over 
available capabilities. Knowledge of the 
absolute values of the parameters does not 
necessarily need to be known. It is very 
useful if we have relative evaluations and 
if we could establish ratios between them 
within a certain tolerance limit.
Also, the results can show that it is 
not necessary to know how the attacker 
allocates resources over his capabilities. 
To take an optimum decision knowledge 
of the budget,  of the nature of attacker’s 
capabilities (in order to estimate the 
cost-effectiveness parameter) and threat 44
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estimates (the value of the targets from 
the attacker’s perspective) is enough.
If we choose the logistic form, with a 
proper parameter (A=2.7), for calculating 
the effectiveness parameter (considered in 
Chapter I), we can obtain results very close 
to the reality. The ratio between operational 
expenditure and investments is 1.6, the same 
as the average in NATO countries.
These simplified models can be the 
first step in a more complex analysis 
of defense capability planning based 
on resource allocation.
Interesting future research can include: 
sensitivity  analysis  and  identification 
of the important parameters which 
have the most influence over resource 
allocation; how the cost-effectiveness 
parameter influences resource allocation, 
and the probability to win against an 
attacker. In this respect, the guiding 
research question could be: “What are the 
circumstances under which the planners 
decide to acquire a new capability instead 
to maintain an older one?”; developing a 
more complex model with multi-purpose 
capabilities in a security environment 
with more independent and/or dependent 
enemies; consider the enemies who act 
both strategically and non-strategically.
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